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Abstract  The paper investigates the effect of asymmetric debt and debt servicing 
obligations on taxes and primary spending in a standard tax competition model, assuming public 
debts are pre-determined and in their steady state. The impact of increasing financial market 
integration and capital mobility on tax and spending asymmetries is then investigated, and the 
results are tested empirically for EU countries. The model predicts that cross country 
asymmetries in debt servicing obligations lead to cross-country asymmetries in taxes and 
spending, and these predictions are supported by the data, with high-debt EU countries having 
lower expenditures and higher taxes than low-debt countries. Moreover, as the impact of 
increasing capital mobility on tax asymmetries is theoretically ambiguous and empirically 
insignificant, increasing capital mobility is found to amplify debt-induced tax distortion 
asymmetries. Finally, higher capital mobility is found to amplify public spending asymmetries 
theoretically as well as empirically across EU member countries. 
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Abstract  The paper investigates the effect of asymmetric debt and debt servicing 
obligations on taxes and primary spending in a standard tax competition model, assuming public 
debts are pre-determined and in their steady state. The impact of increasing financial market 
integration and capital mobility on tax and spending asymmetries is then investigated, and the 
results are tested empirically for EU countries. The model predicts that cross country 
asymmetries in debt servicing obligations lead to cross-country asymmetries in taxes and 
spending, and these predictions are supported by the data, with high-debt EU countries having 
lower expenditures and higher taxes than low-debt countries. Moreover, as the impact of 
increasing capital mobility on tax asymmetries is theoretically ambiguous and empirically 
insignificant, increasing capital mobility is found to amplify debt-induced tax distortion 
asymmetries. Finally, higher capital mobility is found to amplify public spending asymmetries 
theoretically as well as empirically across EU member countries.   2
Introduction 
The standard model of tax competition predicts that increasing mobility of capital will result in 
not only a downward pressure on taxes and sub-optimally low levels of public spending, but also 
a convergence in tax rates and public spending levels
1. These concerns have been particularly 
voiced in a European Union context, where financial integration is, perhaps, farther reaching than 
in any other regionally integrating constellation of sovereign states. This downward convergence 
of tax rates and public spending is partly based on the assumption that  regions engaging in tax 
competition are identical. The assumption of symmetry allows tractability, and in some cases 
solvability, of the model, but is hard to justify empirically. A small number of investigations of 
asymmetric tax competition have shown that tax asymmetries may persist to some degree in a 
perfect capital mobility regime
2. But such asymmetric tax competition models are few and have 
been limited to asymmetries in economic size or factor endowments of the countries engaged in 
tax competition. Other types of asymmetries – while abundant empirically – have yet to be 
modeled. This paper provides a new step into the territory of cross country asymmetries and tax 
competition. 
 
The high and differing levels of public debt of European Union countries is one case of obvious 
asymmetry which is not accounted for in the tax competition literature. While exceptional public 
sector growth took place in virtually all European countries in the last century, its financing 
differed widely, leaving the levels of public debt ranging from 46 percent of GDP in Finland to 
                                                 
1 See Wilson (1999) for a recent review of the literature on tax competition. 
2 The seminal contributions on asymmetry and tax competition are Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991). 
Moreover, recent studies have looked at the effects of the existence of agglomeration economies on the tax 
competition outcome. See for example Baldwin et.al. (2003).   3
116 percent of GDP in Belgium by the end of the 1990s. These public debt asymmetries within 
the EU are reflected in considerable asymmetries in debt servicing obligations. For example, 
Italy, Belgium and Greece spent 16 to 18 percent of tax revenues on interest payments on the 
public debt on average between 1970 and 1999, compared to a 4 percent average for Finland 
during the same period
3. 
 
The asymmetric levels of public debt in the European Union provide for cross country 
differences in the constraints facing a policymaker in choosing a tax rate. A high level of public 
debt and debt servicing obligations reduces fiscal policy flexibility, and evidently, asymmetries 
in debt servicing obligations must be associated with either higher taxes or lower spending in 
high debt countries relative to low debt countries, all else equal. Public debt asymmetries can 
therefore be expected to explain some of the cross-country variation in other fiscal variables.  
 
But does tax competition lead to a reduction in these debt-induced asymmetries in line with the 
standards tax competition results of downward convergence, or conversely, might tax 
competition amplify debt-induced fiscal asymmetries? If the latter is the case, and if increasing 
tax competition amplifies the level of distortions associated with a given level of taxes, then 
high-debt countries will suffer increasingly higher distortions to their economies as financial 
integration proceeds. If the former is the case and taxes converge between high and low debt 
countries, this would leave primary expenditures to adjust to high debt levels and in turn increase 
spending asymmetries as tax competition increases. This paper investigates these issues more 
formally by introducing public debt asymmetries in a model of capital tax competition a la 
                                                 
3 Source: Own canclulations based on OECD Economic Outlook data.    4
Zodrow and Mierzkowski (1986). Two overall questions are addressed. First, prior to engaging in 
tax competition – i.e. in financial autarky - how is the burden of public debt servicing split 
between taxes and public spending? Second, since tax competition is expected to add a 
downward pressure on taxes and, in turn, public spending, the question is raised as to how 
increasing tax competition changes the transmission of public debt asymmetries to asymmetries 
in spending and tax revenues. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 presents the theoretical model and derives four 
testable hypotheses concerning the effects of debt service and capital mobility on taxes and 
primary spending. These hypotheses are tested empirically for a panel of European Union 
countries in Section 2. The final section concludes. 
 
1. The  Model 
The model is based on Zodrow and Mierzkowski (1986). Capital is initially assumed immobile, 
but will later be assumed perfectly mobile internationally, and it is assumed that no country is 
large enough to affect the international after-tax return to capital under perfect capital mobility. 
The latter assumption allows for a focus on the consequences of debt service obligations for the 
indebted country, without getting into a spiral of strategic reactions of the competing countries. 
Each country has three sectors: production, households (the representative citizen) and the 
government. There are two inputs in production: capital and labor. The representative citizen 
owns the production process and supplies a fixed amount of labor. Capital enters with decreasing 
marginal productivity: 
() , 0 , 0 kk k fk f f >< (1)   5
where k is the amount of capital invested in domestic production. The representative citizen’s 
budget constraint is: 
() k xf k f k k ρ =− ⋅ + ⋅ (2) 
where k  is the representative citizen's savings of capital and ρ is the international after-tax return 
to capital. The representative citizen’s utility function is given by
4: 
(,) , , 0 , , 0 , , 0 g x gg xx gx xg ugx u u u u u u ><= (3) 
Till this point, the structure of the model follows that of Zodrow and Mierskowski (1986) closely. 
Now introduce public debt. National public debt levels are assumed to have reached a steady 
state, and the competing countries have entered into an economic union after accumulating the 
public debt, which, in addition to providing for perfect capital mobility, stipulates a balanced 
budget. The effect of changes in debt service on budget items is hence such that spending and 
taxation will change in order to ensure a primary balance equal to the debt servicing obligations. 
Formally, the government has D amount of debt, which is held by overseas creditors
5. The 
government has borrowed at the world rate of interest and has ρD in debt service obligations, 
pays  D ∆ off the debt and provides public goods g, all of which are financed with a specific 
source tax t on capital invested domestically. Obviously, in equilibrium, the government will 
choose not to pay off any debt, since there is no incentive to do so in a model where tomorrow 
does not matter. Hence,  D ∆  is equal to zero. The government budget constraint becomes:  
tk g D ρ ⋅=+ (4) 
                                                 
4 The assumption that the utility function is separable in its two arguments substantially simplifies the analysis and 
makes the model tractable. The same conclusions would be arrived at without this assumption, but would necessitate 
several assumptions concerning the size of the cross derivatives and would obscure the intuition of the model. 
5 If part or all of the public debt is held by the representative citizen, the conclusions do not change for the perfect 
capital mobility case if the interest rate on the public debt are assumed the same as those on savings, and as long as 
the debt held domestically is part of the savings, such that the domestic representative citizen does not have more 
savings to invest than the representative citizen of the competing countries. The conclusions would change,   6
The government is benevolent and chooses the tax rate that maximizes the representative 
citizen’s utility (3), subject to the relevant resource and behavioral constraints of the economy. (4) 
shows that debt servicing obligations constitute a wedge between tax revenues and primary 
expenditures in the budget constraint. Notice that the debt servicing component could represent 
any other lump sum transfer to or from the budget constraint, which is independent of the tax rate 
and does not provide utility to the representative citizen. It could for example represent the 
degree of inefficiency of the public administration of the country in question, income from oil 
possessions, or some windfall gain, and the results of the subsequent analysis can therefore also 
be interpreted in this light. 
  The Case of Zero Capital Mobility 
Consider initially a country in financial autarky. Capital mobility is zero, but assume that the 
balanced budget rule still applies. The representative citizen can only invest in domestic 
production, irrespective of the domestic after-tax return to capital relative to that of other 
countries. Private net income reduces to: 
() xf kt k =− ⋅ (5) 
In this case, the capital source tax does not have an effect on the investment decision of capital 
owners, and the elasticity of capital to the tax rate is zero. This implies that the marginal cost of 
public funds is unity (i.e. increasing overall tax revenues of the government by increasing the tax 
rate will result in a one to one decrease in private net income). Domestic source taxation of 
                                                                                                                                                              
however, if there were no access to international capital markets, in which case domestic production would suffer 
the loss of capital tied up in government bonds.   7
capital is non-distortionary in this case, and the first order condition for the government's 










Totally differentiating the first order condition with respect to debt servicing obligations yields 
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(10) 
The superscript n indicates the financial autarky regime equilibrium values. This simple model of 
fiscal policy confirms the general intuition about how debt servicing obligations affect the two 
sides of the budget: one should expect to see a combination of a lower level of government 
spending and a higher level of taxes in countries with higher debt service obligations compared to 
countries with lower debt servicing obligations, all else equal. Partitioning the cost of debt 
service between taxes and primary expenditures minimizes the utility loss associated with debt 
service payments, due to the assumption of diminishing marginal utility of private net income 
and public spending. The effect on taxes relative to the effect on primary expenditures of debt 
servicing obligations is determined by the parameters of the model as follows. The greater 
                                                 
6 The second order condition is 
22 () 0 gg xx uku k ⋅+⋅ − < . Since the second derivatives of the utility function are   8
(smaller) in absolute value the elasticity of the marginal utility of public goods provision (private 
net income) to the tax rate, the less primary expenditures will adjust and the more taxes will 
increase due to higher debt service. 
  Allowing for Perfect Capital Mobility 
When capital is perfectly mobile, the representative citizen can invest her capital abroad and 
attain the world after-tax return to capital if the after-tax return to capital is lower domestically. 
The financial market equilibrium condition therefore becomes: 
k ft ρ −= (11) 
where fk - t is the domestic after-tax return to capital. The tax rate consequently has an impact on 
the investment decision of investors in domestic production, i.e. taxes are distortionary. The 
marginal cost of public funds is therefore greater than one. Maximizing (3) subject to (2), (4) and 


















 is the marginal cost of public funds, and  k ε  is the elasticity of 
domestically invested capital to the tax rate. Under perfect capital mobility, the equilibrium 
marginal utility of public spending is higher than the marginal utility of private consumption 
since the relative cost of public good provision is higher. The government therefore sets a tax rate 
                                                                                                                                                              
negative, the soc is always fulfilled. 
7 The second order condition is  0
gx uum c p f ε εε ++ > . Assuming that the third derivative of the production 
function is zero is a sufficient condition for satisfying the second order condition, but the second order condition 
also allows for the third derivative to take some positive values.   9
that is lower than the optimal tax rate under zero capital mobility, and equilibrium public 
spending is suboptimally low relative to private spending from a social welfare perspective. 
 
The analysis below takes as starting point the symmetric no-debt tax competition model, and 
looks at how the equilibrium values of the central variables for one country change when the debt 
increases marginally from zero to positive in that country. Let one and only one country go from 
having zero debt to having a positive level of public debt, while staying solvent. Totally 
differentiating the first order condition with respect to debt service yields the derivative of the 
equilibrium tax rate with respect to debt service under perfect capital mobility: 
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(16) 
The superscript p denotes equilibrium values in the perfect capital mobility regime. While (14) 
and (15) are always positive, (16) can take on both positive and negative values, but the 
denominator of (13) is positive when the second order condition is fulfilled (see footnote 7). (13) 
shows that an increase in the debt level will lead to an increases in the tax rate. The mechanism is   10
straightforward: Given the no debt equilibrium tax rate, an increase in debt service obligations 
will initially (i.e. before a policy reaction) result in lower primary public spending without 
changing the tax rate and tax revenues. ug is therefore initially higher than in no-debt countries, 
while ux and the MCPF are the same as in the no debt situation. Increasing the tax rate above its 
no debt equilibrium level - hence redirecting resources from private to public spending - will 
therefore increase utility until the first order condition for optimum is again fulfilled. 
 
In order to evaluate the effect of an increase in the debt level on primary public spending, the 
government budget constraint is totally differentiated with respect to debt service, and (12) and 














The assumption that the elasticity of the marginal cost of public funds is positive is a sufficient 




Now compare the effect of debt service on the tax rate under zero capital mobility with the effect 
of debt service on the tax rate under perfect capital mobility. A priori, one would think that a 
higher marginal cost of public funds would imply that debt servicing obligations would affect 
taxes less and primary spending more. However, the model also allows for the opposite to be the 
case, since the elasticity of the LHS of the first order condition also changes when capital 
becomes mobile. It can be shown that:   11
p n tt
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(18)  
Condition (18) is best understood in terms of the first order conditions under zero and perfect 
capital mobility respectively. The sum of the tax elasticities of the tree components making up 
the first order condition indicate the size of the adjustment to equilibrium: the greater is any of 
the three elasticities, the less of a tax rate increase is needed to get back to equilibrium after an 
increase in debt servicing obligations. Moving from zero to perfect capital mobility increases the 
elasticity of the marginal cost of public funds from zero to positive, but also changes  g ε  and  x ε . 
If  either  g ε  or  x ε  is sufficiently lower under perfect than under zero capital mobility, it may 
allow for the odd case where the increase in debt service results in a greater increase in taxes in 
the perfect capital mobility regime compared to the zero capital mobility case. To see why, 
consider a change in debt from zero to positive. Under zero capital mobility, the increase in debt 
leads to higher taxes and lower spending, and the relative impact on the two sides of the budget 
depends on the parameters of the model. Under perfect capital mobility, there are two additional 
effects of an increase in debt service, both emanating from the distortionary effect of taxation. 
First, there is the marginal effect. When the marginal cost of public funds, and hence the 
distortionary effect of taxation, increases, the effect of debt will shift from the tax side to the 
public spending side of the budget, leaving the effect of debt on taxes lower and the negative 
effect of debt on primary spending higher. The second effect is the infra-marginal effect. Taxes 
are higher in a high-debt country compared to a low-debt country irrespective of the degree of 
capital mobility, as shown by (7) and (13). Therefore, the high-debt economy reaches a higher 
                                                                                                                                                              
8 This assumption is sufficient but not necessary, and imposes a slightly tighter upper limit on the third derivative of   12
level of distortions, a lower level of invested capital, and hence a lower level of overall domestic 
production. There are therefore less resources in the economy to divide between public spending 
and private spending. The isolate infra-marginal effect is therefore that debt will have a greater 
impact on both taxes and spending when capital mobility increases, due to the distortion of 
overall production. 
 
Both the marginal effect and the infra-marginal effect will increase the downward pressure of 
debt servicing obligations on primary public spending. But only the first effect will decrease the 
effect of debt servicing obligations on taxes, while the second effect will increase the effect of 
debt servicing obligations on taxes. Hence, whether the effect of debt on taxes increases or 
decreases when moving from zero to perfect capital mobility depends on the relative importance 
of the marginal and infra-marginal effects, while the effect of debt servicing obligations on public 







Tax competition can therefore be seen as decreasing the cross-country asymmetries of the tax 
burden on capital induced by asymmetric levels of public debt only when condition (18) is 
satisfied. On the other hand, intensifying tax competition will always increase cross-country 
asymmetries in primary spending due to debt asymmetries. 
  Conclusions of the Theoretical Model 
Allowing for asymmetric levels of debt and debt servicing obligations in an otherwise symmetric 
model of capital tax competition shows that these asymmetries lead to cross country asymmetries 
                                                                                                                                                              
the production function than already imposed by the second order condition (see footnote 7).   13
in equilibrium taxes and primary spending. Moreover, holding public debt levels and 
asymmetries constant shows that the impact of capital mobility on capital tax asymmetries is 
ambiguous and depends on the parameters of the model. However, the asymmetries on the public 
spending side unambiguously intensify with increasing capital mobility. Finally, if capital 
mobility does not actually reduce the impact of debt service on capital taxes, then capital 
mobility will increase cross country debt induced distortion asymmetries, simply because higher 
debt means higher taxes and higher capital mobility leads to a higher level of distortions 
associated with a given level of taxes.  
 
A caveat is in place regarding these findings. The model assumes that the government only has 
one tax base, and extending the model to include taxation of a less mobile labor supply would 
greatly increase its relevance. Increasing capital tax competition could thus be expected to lead to 
a shift of the tax burden from capital toward labor, and hence, to increasing labor tax 
asymmetries rather than increasing public spending asymmetries. These speculations are left for 
future modeling. Meanwhile, capital income taxation should be seen in the present case as a 
proxy for overall taxation of a country, assuming that the mobility of all tax bases is at least 
correlated with that of capital income, or that tax revenues from other sources are constant, for 
example at their maximum. The four predictions derived from this model are therefore 
formulated for both overall taxation and capital taxation for the purposes of empirical testing: 
 
1.  The higher the debt service obligations, the higher is the level of taxes, and in particular, the 
higher is the capital tax rate 
2.  The higher the debt service obligations, the lower are primary expenditures   14
3.  The higher the capital mobility, the smaller is the effect of debt service on the level of taxes, 
and in particular on capital taxes, given condition (18). 
4.  The higher the capital mobility, the greater is the downward pressure of debt service on 
primary expenditures 
 
These four predictions are tested empirically for a panel of EU countries in the remainder of this 
paper. 
2. Empirical  Methodology 
According to the model, the asymmetries levels of public debt and debt servicing obligations 
among EU member countries should lead to detectable asymmetries in the levels of tax revenues 
or the level of primary expenditures in EU countries, given that deficit financing of the budget is 
constrained by long term sustainability considerations and – if not to the letter – by the Growth 
and Stability Pact. Moreover, according to the model, European integration and tax competition 
may have had the additional effect of increasing asymmetries in public spending and taxation 
within the European Union. Whether public debt asymmetries have had such effects no taxation 
and spending in the European Union is tested below. A basic specification for estimating the 
direct effects of debt service on the budget is presented below, and in turn, augmented with an 
interaction term of capital mobility and debt service to allow for capital mobility effects. 
 
  The Basic Specification 
The basic estimating equation is inspired by the rather sparse empirical literature on the 
correlations between capital tax rates and measures of capital mobility (see for example Garrett 
and Mitchell, 2001) with slight modifications. In line with how debt and debt service are included   15
in estimating equations for fiscal variables in Roubini and Sachs (1989) and Kontopoulos and 
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BUDGET is the overall tax revenues in percent of GDP (TOTALTAX), the implicit capital tax rate 
(IMPLCAP), and primary spending to GDP (EXPGDP) depending on which hypothesis is tested. 
BY is the ratio of public debt to GDP and RB is debt service obligations. The lagged gross debt to 
GDP ratio is included to control for efforts made to stabilize the budget. The overall tax rate and 
the capital tax should therefore be positive functions of the lagged debt to GDP ratio while 
expenditures should depend negatively on the debt to GDP ratio. Ω contains control variables 
included in the regression. The inclusion of real growth (GR) controls for real changes in 
nominally fixed budgets expenditure when nominal budgets are sticky,  and is hence expected to 
affect overall taxes, capital taxes and spending negatively. Inflation (INFL) controls for the 
changes in tax revenues due to changes in distribution of income between nominal tax brackets. 
Inflation also proxies for money growth and, in turn, monetary financing of the budget. There is 
hence no clear expectation of the sign of the effect of inflation on taxes while the effect of 
inflation on spending is expected to be positive. Openness of the economy, OPEN, is included to 
control for the often hypothesized effect of the degree of openness on the optimal size of the 
public sector (see Rodrik, 1999). OPEN  has been cleaned of country-size effects as explained in 
Appendix 1, and is expected to affect taxes and expenditures positively. Demographic changes   16
are controlled for by including the participation ratio, PART. PART is defined as the labor force 
in percent of total population between 15 and 65 years of age, and should affect taxes and 
expenditures to GDP negatively as higher participation is associated with a lower need for social 
insurance payments. The unemployment rate, UN, is included to account for direct effects of 
unemployment on tax receipts and is therefore expected to affect the overall and capital taxes 
negatively and spending positively. Finally, a dummy taking the value one in the Maastricht 
years (MAAS) is included to control for the effect of the Maastricht criteria regarding fiscal 
variables. Further explanatory and control variables could be included – notably political 
variables such as ideology of incumbent government and election cycles – but are left out for 
parsimony and data availability reasons. The robustness of the results to the inclusion of such 
variables is checked however. The model is estimated in first differences to reduce suspicions 
that results are spurious (apart from growth and inflation, all variables exhibit unit roots), as well 
as to avoid the bias introduced in fixed effects regressions when the lagged dependent variable is 
included as explanatory variable
9.  
 
A few comments on the obvious sources of endogeneity of the above specification are in place. 
First, growth and inflation may be explained by budget variables rather than the other way 
around. This is taken into account by lagging the explanatory variables by one period. But more 
importantly in the present context of debt and debt service effects on the budget, higher tax 
revenues (lower spending) may lead to a decrease of the public debt, in turn reducing debt service 
the following year. This latter source of endogeneity could turn out to bias the estimates of the 
debt servicing variables directly if the contemporaneous debt service component were used in 
                                                 
9 Growth and inflation could be included in first differences in line with the rest of the variables. However, including   17
(20). Now, the lag, and not the contemporaneous, value of the change in debt service is used as 
explanatory variable. Using the lag of debt service changes the nature of the simultaneity, but 
does not completely eliminate it. Changes in tax revenues or spending may potentially be 
correlated with the lagged changes (i.e. there may be persistence in the changes of taxes and 
spending), which in turn would be correlated with the lagged change in debt as described above. 
If changes in taxes or expenditures are auto-correlated and the first difference of taxes or 
expenditures are correlated with the contemporaneous change in debt service, then this may be a 
problem. If, however, the first differences of taxes or expenditures are not persistent, or if the 
first difference of taxes or expenditures is not correlated with the contemporaneous change in 
debt service, there should not be a problem of endogeneity. When calculating the latter 
correlation, it in fact turns out to be insignificant, and the latter source of endogeneity is hence 
not expected to result in important biases of the parameter estimates. Moreover, since the 
presence of endogeneity would bias the parameter estimates toward zero, the true parameter 
estimates would have the same sign but be larger in absolute value than the biased estimate. The 
presence of endogeneity would therefore still allow for drawing qualitative conclusions, although 
the parameter estimates would only indicate a lower limit to what the true estimate would be
10. 
 
Allowing for Capital Mobility 
Increasing capital mobility affects the budget in two ways according to the tax competition 
model: it has a direct effect on the equilibrium tax rate and level of primary expenditures - the 
traditional tax competition hypothesis - and it affects the reaction to changes in government debt 
                                                                                                                                                              
these variables in levels or first differences does not change the conclusions, but using levels gives more plausible 
results, and they have therefore been kept in levels.   18
service. To account for this, an index of capital mobility is included in the estimating equation in 

































The included variables and subscripts are as outlined for equation (20) except for the variable 
Icap, which is an index of the degree of capital mobility and computed as described below. The 
parameter estimate for the pure debt service term in (20) therefore measures the effect of debt 
service on the dependent variable under perfect capital mobility, while the interaction term 
measures the change in the effect of debt service when capital mobility increases (i.e. the change 
in the effect of debt service per unit of Icap). Support for hypotheses 3 and 4 would therefore 
require that the interaction term have the opposite sign of the debt service term for taxes and the 
same sign as the debt service term for expenditures, given that hypotheses 1 and 2 are accepted. 
  The Data 
The sample consists of yearly data for 14 EU member countries (EU15 less Luxembourg) from 
1980 to 2000, with some variation in the length of the individual country series. Definitions and 
precise sources of the data are given in Appendix 1. Some data issues deserve further comments. 
First, the exercise of measuring capital mobility empirically is not straightforward. Suggested 
proxies for capital mobility are plenty, most with more drawbacks than advantages and none of 
them perfect (see Edison et al. (2002) for a recent survey). For the purposes of the present study, 
                                                                                                                                                              
10 Due to the contemporaneous simultaneity, lagging the explanatory variables does lead to a situation where the 
dependent variable may be correlated with the lagged error terms. However, this should not bias or render the   19
capital mobility is measured by the absolute value of covered interest parity differentials on 
three-month interbank deposits, with the advantage of using a measure which takes into account 
the actual intensity of capital controls, but with the drawback of measuring the mobility of a very 
small segment of capital, namely that of short term financial capital flows. Assuming that the 
mobility of longer term and real capital is correlated with that of short term financial capital, this 
drawback is considered acceptable, or at least more acceptable than the drawbacks associated 
with other capital mobility measures used in the literature. Icap is set equal to minus the absolute 
deviation from covered interest parity in order to ensure that an increase in the measure indicates 
an increase in capital mobility. The highest value, indicating perfect capital mobility, is thus zero. 
Second, measuring the tax burden on capital is equally subject to pitfalls. Basing the measure on 
capital or corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP would not take into account changes in the 
tax base (corporate profits) which is generally considered to have increased significantly suing 
the 1990s. To account for this problem, an implicit tax rate is used, based on capital tax revenues 
and divided by an estimate of the capital tax base calculated according to the method of Carey 
and Rabesona (2002), which is a modified version of the Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) 
methodology. The drawbacks of using this measure consists mainly in the lack of accuracy of the 
estimate of the tax base as well as the fact that it is ex post and as such does not take into account 
the effect of behavioral responses to changes in taxes on the tax base. These drawbacks should be 
kept in mind when interpreting the results. One more variable needed for the empirical analysis 
deserves attention: how to measure debt servicing obligations. In a world similar to that of the tax 
competition model outlined in Section 1, with no tomorrow and hence no growth, the measure is 
the pure nominal interest payments on the public debt:  
                                                                                                                                                              
estimates inconsistent.   20
 
1 tt DS r b ≡⋅ (23) 
where b is the debt to GDP and r is the average nominal interest rate on government debt. But the 
government budget constraint is affected by growth, and allowing for GDP growth makes the 
choice of how to measure debt service less clear. An alternative measure of debt service, which is 
similar to the measure proposed by Roubini and Sachs (1989) and used in several studies after 
that, is given by the intertemporal budget constraint: 
 
2( ) tt t DS r b σ ≡− ⋅ (24) 
where σ  is the nominal growth rate. Using the DS2 measure of debt service implicitly assumes 
that policy responds to the level of the primary balance, tt - gt, needed to keep the debt to GDP 
ratio unchanged. If growth increases, it gives the same leeway in the budget as if the interest rate 
on the public debt decreases, so a change in the interest rate on public debt only matters budget 
wise if the growth rate does not change in the same way as well. DS1, on the other hand, assumes 
that the policy response to changes in growth and interest payments are not the same, although 
the two effects provide the same air in the overall budget. One reason for such a behavior of 
policy makers could be that pure interest payments directly and visibly affect the budget and are 
predictable, while the effects of growth, all else equal, is to reduce the debt to GDP ratio 
indirectly, and this effect is observed with a lag compared to the interest payments effect, as 
accounts and statistics become available. Hence, in short, the cash effect of pure interest 
payments in the budget has a different timing that the growth effect, and this could potentially 
affect the response of the policy maker. 
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If DS2 is the measure that policy makers respond to, and σt·b t and rt·b t are not correlated, the 
parameter estimates of DS2 and DS1 should be the same. However, since σt·b t and rt·b t are found 
to be positively correlated empirically
11, using DS1 will bias the parameter estimate toward zero 
if DS2 is the correct measure. If, on the other hand, DS1 is the correct measure and σt·b t does not 
have significant explanatory power, using DS2 in the regression will imply a higher standard 
error of the parameter estimate. A regression including the interest part and the growth part 
separately can be used to test whether DS2 is the right measure of debt service impacting on the 
budget, by testing whether the parameter estimate of the interest rate term is equal to minus the 
estimate of the growth term. Carrying out this test, DS2 does turn out to have higher standard 
errors of the parameter estimate while parameter estimates for DS1 are greater in size, and robust 
to the inclusion of σt·b t . Moreover, the parameter estimates of the growth and the interest 
components cannot be accepted as being equal statistically (see the Wald test statistics in Table 
1). Only DS1 has therefore been used in the following analysis. DS1 and DS2 are defined and 
calculated as implicit rates as laid out in Appendix 1. 
  The Estimation Results 
The Basic Specification 
Table 1 shows the results of the regressions of the basic specification given by (21) for the tax 
revenues to GDP ratio, the implicit capital tax rate and primary expenditures to GDP ratio. The 
regressions are carried out for an unbalanced panel with fixed effects
12 using feasible GLS, thus 
accounting for contemporaneous correlation as well as cross sectional heteroscedasticity. The 
signs of the parameter estimates are for the most part either as expected and in line with the 
                                                 
11 With a correlation coefficient of 0.74 in the EU14 panel from 1973 to 1999.   22
previous literature on the determinants of fiscal policy, or insignificant, with a few exceptions. 
The participation ratio is significant but with the wrong sign in the two tax regressions, and the 
unemployment rate is significant with the wrong sign in the capital tax regression and the 
expenditure regression. Interestingly, the dummy for the Maastricht years takes the predicted 
signs is is significant on the 10 percent level in the expenditures regression, implying that the 
entry into force of the Maastricht convergence criteria was associated with a reduction in 
spending to of GDP of 0.37 percentage points. 
 
(Table 1 IN HERE) 
 
How Does Debt Servicing Affect Taxes and Spending (H1 and H2)? 
The regression results confirm hypothesis one, by showing that a one percentage point increase in 
the debt service to GDP ratio results in a 0.37 percentage point increase in the tax revenue to 
GDP ratio, a 0.26 percentage point increase in the implicit capital tax rate and 0.35 percentage 
point fall in the primary expenditures to GDP ratio the following year. Since the sum of the two 
parameter estimates of the total tax regression commented on above, and the parameter estimate 
of the expenditures regression is below one, the change in debt service is not fully adjusted to in 
the budget the following year. The significantly positive effect on overall taxes is robust to the 
inclusion of a dummy for political ideology (the construction of which is discussed in Appendix 
1), the current and the first lead of a dummy for election year to capture election cycle effects on 
                                                                                                                                                              
12 The results of the Haussman test indicated fixed effects. The estimated fixed effects are not shown but can be 
obtained from the author.   23
the budget, and overall interest rate changes (see Table 4)
13. In order to test whether the effect of 
debt service changed due to the fiscal provisions of the Maastricht treaty and their continuation in 
the shape of the Stability and Growth Pact, the regressions are also estimated including an 
interaction term between debt servicing and the Maastricht dummy as a robustness test. The 
results, presented in Table 6, show that the parameter estimates of the debt servicing terms are 
robust to this inclusion in all three regressions, and moreover, the interaction terms are 
insignificant. 
 
 Table 2 shows the percentage change in the tax to GDP ratio and the primary expenditures to 
GDP ratio due to debt service in 1999 implied by the parameter estimate of the basic regression. 
According to the calculations, Greece was the country most affected by debt service obligations 
in 1999, with an estimated 9.05 percent increase in the tax to GDP ratio and an estimated 8.37 
percent fall in primary expenditures to GDP due to debt service obligations. In comparison, 
France was estimated to have had 2.7 percent higher taxes and 2.41 percent lower expenditures to 
GDP due to debt service during that year. Cross country differences in the level of debt may 
therefore be a non-negligible source of asymmetry in the overall tax burden across EU countries. 
 
(Table 2 IN HERE) 
 
In order to single out the types of expenditures which are reduced as a consequence of debt 
service obligations, regressions are carried out using as dependent variables four major items of 
primary spending. The parameter estimates of debt service obtained from these regressions are 
                                                 
13 The correlation could be suspected of being the result of “common shocks” in that taxes, spending and debt   24
given in Table 3. Government expenditures on non-wage consumption and social security 
payments are not significantly affected by changes in debt servicing obligations. Government 
expenditures on wage consumption is significantly affected by debt service, but rather modestly. 
In contract, government investment expenditures are found to respond significantly with a 
reduction of 0.69 percentage points to an increase in debt servicing obligations of one percentage 
point.  
 
(Table 3 IN HERE) 
 
The conclusion of the test of hypotheses one and two is that higher debt and hence debt servicing 
obligations lead to higher taxes, higher capital taxes and lower overall spending. Moreover, the 
data indicates that public investments constitute the main part of spending reduced when debt 
servicing increases. If public investments in fact increase productivity and growth, the results 
indicate that high debt and debt servicing levels may have implications for high-debt countries’ 
ability to grow themselves out of their public debt in the future. 
 
Does Tax Competition Increase Debt Induced Asymmetries (H3 and H4)? 
Hypotheses three and four concerning the change of the effect of debt service on taxes and 
expenditures of increasing capital mobility are tested by estimating equation (22) for overall 
taxes, the implicit capital tax rate and primary expenditures. The estimation procedure is the 
same as above. Greece and Finland have been excluded from the sample due to the few available 
                                                                                                                                                              
servicing could all three in principle be correlated with interest rates, and in turn with each other without any causal 
link.    25
observations of the capital mobility variable for these countries
14. Additionally, the inclusion of 
Icap in the regression lowers the number of observations used in the regression substantially, 
which should be kept in mind in interpreting the results. The regression results are shown in 
Table 4. In general, the parameter estimates have slightly higher standard errors, which may be 
due both to the shorter sample or the slight increase in multicollinearity introduced by the 
inclusion of the capital mobility terms. 
(Table 4  IN HERE) 
 
The inclusion of the capital mobility terms increases the size of the parameter estimates of the 
debt service terms in all three regressions. Moreover, interestingly, the capital mobility term 
alone is insignificant in all three regressions implying that tax competition has not affected taxes 
– neither capital taxes nor other taxes – or spending as of yet
15.  
 
Turning to the question of interest here, the parameter estimates for the interaction terms between 
debt service and capital mobility show that the hypothesis that increased capital mobility should 
result in a smaller effect of debt servicing obligations on overall and capital taxes is not 
supported by the data. In turn, the tax induced level of distortions to high-debt countries must be 
higher relative to low-debt countries, the more mobile capital becomes. Hence, asymmetries in 
tax induced distortions increase with financial integration and capital mobility.  
 
                                                 
14 The exclusion of these two countries does not considerably change the parameter estimate of DS1 in the 
regression given in Table 1. 
15 Finding an insignificant parameter estimate for the capital mobility term is in line with the general results (or lack 
thereof) of the empirical literature testing basic tax competition hypotheses. See Garret and Mitchell (2001) for a 
recent example.   26
Capital mobility is found to increase the downward pressure of debt service on primary 
expenditures, and the parameter estimates of debt servicing and the interaction between debt 
servicing and capital mobility are robust to the inclusion of political variables and changes in the 
interest rate. The effect of a one percentage point increase in the DS1 under perfect capital 
mobility (i.e. when Icap=0) is to reduce the primary expenditures ratio with 0.46 percentage 
points, and this impact is 0.22 percentage points smaller in absolute value for every percentage 
point decrease of the Icap below zero. The fact that the average value of Icap for European 
Union countries increased from about –2 percentage points in the early 1990s to zero for the 
countries joining the Euro in 1999 gives an impression of the quantitative importance of these 
estimates. Hence, according to the data, the speeding up of financial integration in the 1990s lead 
to an average increase in the impact of debt servicing obligations on primary spending ratios of 
about 0.44 percentage points, or almost the entire amount of the debt induced asymmetries. 
 
The case of no support for hypothesis 3 while some support for hypotheses four is found 
conforms to the special case in the model where the infra-marginal effect of increasing capital 
mobility outweighs the marginal effect of higher marginal cost of public funds (i.e. the case in 
which condition (18) is not fulfilled).  
3. Conclusion 
Allowing for asymmetric levels of public debt in an otherwise symmetric tax competition model 
shows how debt service obligations lead to higher taxes and lower spending in high-debt 
countries relative to low-debt countries. Moreover, while the impact of increasing capital 
mobility on tax asymmetries is theoretically ambiguous and depends on the parameters of the 
model, going from zero to positive capital mobility results in debt-induced tax distortion   27
asymmetries due to the simple fact that high-debt countries have higher taxes irrespective of the 
degree of capital mobility. Furthermore, higher capital mobility is found to amplify public 
spending asymmetries theoretically. 
 
The predictions of the model are largely supported by the data for a panel of European Union 
countries. Debt servicing obligations significantly increase total tax revenues in percent of GDP 
and implicit capital tax rates in EU member countries. Moreover, primary expenditures are 
significantly lower the higher are debt servicing obligations. In particular, debt servicing seems 
to reduce public investments more than any other category of public spending. The impact of 
capital mobility on the effect of debt servicing obligations on taxes is insignificant, implying that 
the level of debt induced distortions to high-debt economies relative to their low-debt 
counterparts increases with the degree of capital mobility. Capital mobility is found to 
significantly amplify the effect of debt service on primary spending.  
 
The findings indicate that the highly asymmetric levels of public debt across EU member 
countries explain some of the cross country asymmetries in national tax and spending levels 
within the EU. In addition, rather than inducing convergence, the process of financial integration 
within the Single Market may have been magnifying public debt induced primary spending 
asymmetries, as well as asymmetries in the level of tax induced distortions to the economies of 
the European Union. 
 
These results have several implications. If a higher level of tax induced distortions hampers 
growth relative to less distorted economies, and if public investments increase future productivity   28
and growth, then the results indicate two mechanisms by which public debt may adversely affect 
growth. Public debt asymmetries may therefore induce growth asymmetries among EU countries. 
Moreover, a high level of debt and debt servicing obligations may hamper high-debt countries’ 
efforts to grow out of their public debts. Finally, if these negative links between debt and growth 
have intensified due to increasing financial market integration in the European Union, then all 
else equal, integration itself could be placed under suspicion of having hampered the 
convergence of public debt and deficit to GDP ratios in the EU.   29
Appendix 1: Data Sources and Definitions 
The data used in the empirical analysis are described in Table 5. The overall sample size is 1972 
to 2000. Some series start later or end earlier and the panel is hence unbalanced. The countries 
included in the sample are the EU15 less Luxembourg due to poor data availability. In line with 
the empirical literature on the effects of ideology on fiscal policy, data provided by Woldendorp 
et al. (2000) on ideology of the government in power is used in the construction of the index of 
ideology. They provide a classification of the ideology of government by breaking it down to five 
cases. 1. Right wing parties dominate both government and parliament. 2. Right wing or center 
parties make up between 33.3% and 66.6% of government. 3. Center parties make up more than 
50% of government. 4. Left wing or center parties make up between 33.3% and 66.6% of 
government. 5. Left wing parties dominate government. Woldendorp et al. (2000) describes how 
the distinction has been made between right wing, center and left wing parties. On the basis of 
this data series, the left wing dummy (LEFT) takes the value one in case 4 and 5. 
 
(Table 5 IN HERE) 
 
Appendix 2: Robustness tests 
 
 
(Table 6 IN HERE) 
 
 
(Table 7 IN HERE) 
 
 
(Table 8 IN HERE) 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Results for the basic specification. Sample: 1980-2000 
  ∆TOTALTAX  ∆IMPLCAP  ∆EXPGDP 
 Para- 
meter 
Est. t-stat  p-value 
Para- 
meter 
Est. t-stat  p-value 
Para- 
meter 
Est. t-stat  p-value 
∆DS1-1 0.37  5.47  0.00  0.26  2.28  0.02  -0.35  -3.92  0.00 
∆BY-1  0.003 0.79  0.43  0.01  1.43  0.15  -0.04 -6.89  0.00 
GR-1  -0.05 -2.47  0.01  -0.08  -2.72  0.01  -0.17 -7.14  0.00 
INFL-1  0.02 0.93  0.35  0.02  0.38  0.70  0.13 4.22  0.00 
∆OPEN-1  -0.001 -0.16  0.87  0.02  2.94  0.00  -0.01  -1.74  0.08 
∆PART-1  0.20 3.08  0.00  0.36  4.24  0.00  0.01 0.16  0.87 
∆UN-1  -0.01 -0.12  0.90  -0.36  -5.70  0.00  -0.11 -2.66  0.00 
MAAS-1  0.11 0.94  0.35  0.10  0.54  0.59  -0.37  -1.66  0.09 
Observations   258      241     255   
F-test (all slopes=0)    6.66  (p=0.00)   16.1  (p=0.00)   10.2  (p=0.00) 
DW   2.02      1.87     2.18   
R
2   0.10      0.23     0.20   
Wald-test
 /a   10.8  (p=0.00)   0.18  (p=0.67)   4.03  P=(0.04) 
/a: In a regression using DS2 but splitting up DS2 into the interest rate term and the growth term, the Wald test is for 
the restriction that the parameter estimate of the interest rate term is equal to minus the parameter estimate of the 
growth-debt interaction term, which would support the use of DS2.   33
 
Table 2. The percentage change in overall tax and expenditures ratios due to debt service in 1999 according to 
parameter estimates, percent. 
 
Overall Taxes in percent of 
GDP 
Primary Expenditures in 
percent of GDP 
Greece  9.05  -8.37 
Italy  5.89  -6.06 
Belgium  5.75  -5.78 
Netherlands  4.08  -4.07 
Spain  3.83  -3.67 
Sweden  3.77  -3.66 
Germany 3.45  -3.44 
Denmark  3.34  -3.22 
Portugal  3.33  -2.92 
Austria  3.26  -2.92 
Ireland  3.19  -2.73 
UK  2.84  -2.70 
France  2.70  -2.41 
b) The number for Greece is calculated for 1997 due to lack of availability of later data.   34
 
Table 3: The estimated effect of debt service on four major items of government primary expenditures 
 Average  EU 






consumption expenditure in 






















Social security benefits paid 






/a:  Estimates are significantly different from zero on the 1% significance level, except for social security and non-
wage consumption, which are insignificant.   35
 
Table 4. Results for the specification including Icap. Sample: 1980-2000. 
  ∆TOTALTAX  ∆IMPLCAP  ∆EXPGDP 
 Para- 
meter 
Est. t-stat  p-value 
Para- 
meter 
Est. t-stat  p-value 
Para- 
meter 
Est. t-stat  p-value 
∆DS1-1  0.72 3.40 0.00 0.32 1.02 0.31 -0.46  -2.05 0.04 
-CIP-1*∆DS1-1  0.01 0.09 0.92 -0.20 -1.23 0.22 -0.22 -1.94 0.04 
-∆CIP-1  -0.08 -0.84 0.39 -0.10 -0.54 0.59 -0.18 -1.42 0.16 
∆BY-1  0.02 2.49 0.01 0.02 2.05 0.04 -0.01  -1.77 0.07 
GR-1  0.01 0.14 0.88 0.05 0.71 0.48 -0.15  -3.54 0.00 
INFL-1  0.06 1.74 0.08 0.02 0.43 0.66 0.03 0.86 0.38 
∆OPEN-1  0.002  0.26 0.79 0.01 1.69 0.09  -0.002  -0.51 0.61 
∆PART-1  0.30 2.98 0.00 0.32 1.91 0.06 0.43 4.32 0.00 
∆UN-1  -0.18 -2.74 0.01 -0.28 -2.73 0.01 -0.07 -0.88 0.38 
MAAS-1  0.07 0.45 0.65 0.23 0.89 0.37 -0.37  -1.59 0.11 
Observations  131    164    161    
DW  2.07    1.89    1.83    
R
2  0.18    0.30    0.28    
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Table 5: Definitions and sources of data used in the panel regression analysis  
Variable  Definition and Sources 
EXPGDP  Primary expenditures in percent of GDP. Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
IMPLCAP  Implicit tax rate on capital calculated according to Carey and Rabesona (2002) on the 
basic of OECD revenue statistics. Source: Personal communication from David Carey. 
TOTALTAX  Total tax revenues in percent of GDP. Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
Icap  Calculated as one minus the yearly average of monthly observations of absolute deviation 
from covered interest parity on 3 month interbank deposit interest rates vis-à-vis the 
German ditto. The underlying assumption is hence that German capital mobility was near 
perfect during the period studied. Data on forward and spot exchange rates for calculating 
the forward premium is from Datastream. Interest rate data is from OECD Main Economic 
Indicators 
BY  First difference of the debt to GDP ratio (Nominal gross debt and nominal gross domestic 
product). Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
DS1  Gross interest payments on public debt in percent of GDP 
DS2  The average nominal interest on government debt less the nominal growth rate times the 
debt to GDP ratio. The average interest on government debt is approximated by the gross 
interest payment on public debt divided by the gross debt. Source: OECD Economic 
Outlook 
GR  Real growth rate, calculated using data on nominal GDP and the GDP deflator. Source: 
OECD Economic Outlook 
INFL  The yearly percentage change in the consumer price index. Source: OECD Economic 
Outlook 
OPEN  Residuals of a regression of the sum of exports and imports divided by 1.000.000*GDP 
(all in current local currency) on the relative size of the country (size is measures as real 
GDP in percent of sum of real GDP of the panel countries). Source: OECD Economic 
Outlook 
UN  Unemployment rate, percent. Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
PART  The participation rate, constructed as the labor force in percent of the population between 
the age of 15 and 65. Data for Portugal are from the Ameco database. Otherwise, the 
source is OECD Economic Outlook. 
MAAS  Dummy for the Maastricht years, taking the value 1 from 1993 onwards. 
LEFT  Dummy for the ideology of the government in power. Construction as explained above. 
Source: Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000) 
IR  Long term interest rate, percent. Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
EYEAR  Dummy taking the value 1 in years of parliamentary elections of the given country, and 




expenditure in percent 
of GDP 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
Government wage 
expenditure in percent 
of GDP 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
Government 
investments and other 
capital transactions in 
percent of GDP 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
Social security benefits 
paid in percent of GDP 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook   37
 
Table 6. Hypothesis 1 and 2: Results for the primary expenditures regression including the Maastricht 
dummy interacted with debt service. Sample: 1980-2000 
Dependent 
Variable 






e t-stat  p-value 
Paramete
r 





∆DS1-1 0.34  3.66  0.00  0.42  2.56  0.01  -0.42  -3.85  0.00 
MAAS*∆DS1-1 0.130 0.87  0.38  -0.31  -1.37  0.17  0.24  1.14  0.26 
∆BY-1 0.003  0.79  0.42  0.01  1.63  0.10  -0.04  -6.97  0.00 
GR-1  -0.05 -2.42  0.02  -0.08  -2.60  0.01  -0.16  -7.06  0.00 
INFL-1  0.02 1.02 0.30  0.02  0.36  0.71  0.12  4.11  0.00 
∆OPEN-1  -0.001 -0.18  0.85  0.02  2.98  0.00  -0.01  -1.74  0.08 
∆PART-1  0.19 3.12 0.00  0.35  4.16  0.00  0.02  0.25  0.80 
∆UN-1  -0.01 -0.19  0.84  -0.34  -5.39  0.00  -0.11  -2.82  0.01 
MAAS-1  0.11 0.92 0.35  0.08  0.45  0.64  -0.36  -1.60  0.11 
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Table 7. Hypothesis 1 and 2: Robustness of parameter estimates to the inclusion of other explanatory 
variables. Sample: 1980-1996
a 
  ∆TOTALTAX  ∆IMPLCAP  ∆EXPGDP 
 Parameter 









∆DS1-1 0.31  3.41  0.00  0.35  2.41 0.02 -0.58 -10.04  0.00 
∆BY-1  0.01 1.41  0.16  0.01 1.63  0.10  -0.04  -9.32  0.00 
GR-1  -0.07 -3.05  0.00  -0.12 -3.54  0.00  -0.27  -18.12  0.00 
INFL-1  -0.04 -1.71  0.09  -0.02 -0.41  0.68  0.25 10.43  0.00 
∆OPEN-1  -0.01 -0.81  0.42  0.026 3.20  0.00  -0.01 -2.39  0.02 
∆PART-1  0.14 2.09  0.04  0.50 4.69  0.00  -0.14  -2.41  0.01 
∆UN-1  0.03 0.60  0.55  -0.32  -3.83  0.00  -0.13  -5.02  0.00 
MAAS-1  0.11 0.77  0.44  0.38 1.38  0.17  -0.27  -0.96  0.34 
∆IR –1 0.11  3.11 0.00  0.095 1.49  0.14  0.30  8.68  0.00 
LEFT  -0.22 -2.58  0.01  -0.45 -3.62  0.00  -0.17 -2.68  0.01 
EYEAR+
1 
-0.22 -2.45  0.02  -0.11 -0.83  0.41  -0.35 -4.77  0.00 
EYEAR  -0.71  -7.64  0.00  -0.79  -5.98  0.00  -0.25  -3.52 0.00 
DW  2.029     1.876     2.25    
a: The time dimension of the sample is limited by the times series on ideology, which end in 1996.   39
 
Table 8. Hypothesis 3 and 4: Robustness of parameter estimates to the inclusion of other explanatory 
variables. Sample: 1980-1999
a 
  ∆TOTALTAX  ∆IMPLCAP  ∆EXPGDP 
 Paramet
er 
Estimate t-stat p-value 
Paramete
r 
Estimate t-stat  p-value 
Paramete
r 
Estimate t-stat  p-value 
∆DS1-1 0.82  3.81  0.00  0.07  0.26  0.79  -0.49  -2.18  0.03 
-CIP-1*∆DS1-1  0.04 0.36 0.71  -0.34 -2.22  0.03  -0.20 -1.72  0.08 
- ∆ CIP-1  -0.13 -1.50 0.13  -0.18 -1.04 0.29  -0.12 -0.90 0.37 
∆BY-1  0.01 2.48 0.01  0.02 2.34  0.02 -0.015  -1.88  0.06 
GR-1  0.004 0.11 0.91  0.06  0.87 0.38  -0.21 -4.55 0.00 
INFL-1  0.04 1.60 0.11  0.03 0.71  0.47  0.02 0.54 0.59 
∆OPEN-1  0.005 0.52 0.59  0.01  1.83 0.07  -0.001 -0.39 0.69 
∆PART-1  0.33 3.32 0.00  0.31 1.93  0.05  0.47 4.49 0.00 
∆UN-1  -0.14 -2.27 0.02  -0.27 -3.27 0.00  -0.049 -0.56 0.57 
MAAS-1  0.09 0.59 0.55  0.12 0.53  0.59  -0.28 -1.21  0.23 
∆IR –1 -0.04  -1.11  0.26  -0.16  -2.42  0.01  0.13  2.15  0.03 
EYEAR+1 -0.001  -0.02  0.99 0.13 0.86  0.38 -0.23  -1.88  0.06 
EYEAR  -0.50  -7.25  0.00  -0.71  -4.63  0.00  -0.27  -2.23  0.03 
DW  2,13     2.29     1.71    
a: 1980-1997 when the implicit tax rate is used. Controlling for the ideology dummy is left out as this reduces the 
number of observations to a degree that renders results uninteresting in the present regression. 
a: The time dimension of the sample is limited by the times series on ideology, which end in 1996. 
 